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A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL




A. Constitutional Adjudication Systems
The constitutional court is often called the last safeguard of the peo-
ples' fundamental rights. To strengthen the protection of the peoples'
rights, the Korean Constitutional Court (hereinafter KCC) was estab-
lished in Korea in 1988, separate from the general courts. In the past, Ko-
rea had a so-called "Constitutional Committee" which seemingly imitated
the French Constitutional Council. It was, however, a nominal constitu-
tional institution where not even one case was filed under the constitution
of the Fifth Republic (1981-1987).
Under the constitution of the Third Republic, the Korean Supreme
Court carried out constitutional adjudication though it did not do so ac-
tively or meaningfully. The KCC, in contrast, has been very active, hav-
ing settled by the end of January 1993, 1339 out of 1692 cases filed since
its establishment. The KCC has become the center of public interest,
contributed much to the protection of the peoples' rights, and has been a
force nurturing real constitutionalism in Korea. On the other hand, how-
ever, it has run into conflict with other existing governmental institutions,
especially with the Korean Supreme Court on the question of jurisdiction,
which do not welcome the reduction of their power brought on by the
appearance of the KCC. Sometimes counterparts take a threatening atti-
tude toward the very existence of the KCC.
I believe the time has come to evaluate the past achievements of the
KCC and consider systematic reform measures for the KCC itself. By
J.S.D. University of California, Berkeley, May 1999.
I. On the statistical data of the KCC's decisions, see Chong-Seo Kim, Hunbubjaepanui
Silsangye Daehan Tongkejeok Bunseok [Statistical Analysis on the Activities of the Korean
Constitutional Court], Hunbubjaepanu Ironkwa Silje [Theory and Reality of Constitutional
Adjudicationj 609, 611-20 (1993).
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
doing so we can consolidate its position, accelerate the speed of its devel-
opment, and achieve thorough protection of the peoples' rights in the fu-
ture.
B. Suitability of a Comparative Perspective and Methodology
The constitutional adjudication system in Korea has been deeply in-
fluenced by the United States and Germany. There is no country in the
world that does not have a Constitution, either written or unwritten. In
many countries, so-called constitutional adjudication is based on consti-
tutional law. Generally speaking, there are two types of constitutional
adjudication institutions. One type establishes the Constitutional Court as
a special court, while the other is the type in which constitutional adjudi-
cation is conducted by general courts, especially by the Supreme Court in
the final instance, without other special courts. If we can say that Ger-
many is the typical example of the former,2 we can also say the U.S. is
that of the latter.3 In essence, Korea belongs to the former type because it
has a Constitutional Court as a special court apart from the other general
courts. However, the adoption of many features of both the U.S. and
Germany has contributed to a mixed system.
For this reason, I will generally survey the constitutional adjudication
systems in the U.S. and Germany individually. Next, I will explain the
Korean system, introducing the features of each country that have af-
fected Korea and how they have been adopted and exist in the Korean
system. Based on this analysis, I will propose some reform measures.
However, before this institutional comparison, I will explain the historical
background of constitutional adjudication by examining federalism in
each of the three countries.
Following the institutional comparison, I will trace the threads of
independence and even the very existence of the constitutional adjudica-
tion institutions of the three countries. When the courts raised their inde-
2. Unlike the U.S., in civil law countries, including Germany, it is thought that constitu-
tional cases are not appropriate to be adjudicated by judges of general courts who are ori-
ented only to civil and criminal adjudication based on literal interpretation of provisions and
automatic application of law to the actual cases. Consequently, many civil law countries have
established a constitutional court separate from general courts in jurisdiction and composi-
tion. See Mauro Cappelletti and John Clark Adams, Judicial Review of Legislation: Euro-
pean Antecedents and Adaptations, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1207, 1219-22 (1966); Mauro Cap-
pelletti, Judicial Review in Comparative Perspective, 58 CAL. LR. 1017, 1045-50 (1970);
See generally MAURO CAPPELLEITI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD
53-66 (1971).
3. The U.S. Supreme Court is not simply the highest general court for a final appeal in
the American judicial system, but it actually also serves as a special court which takes exclu-
sive charge of some constitutional cases. See, JOEL B. GROSSMAN & RICHARD S. WELLS,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING 7-13 (2d ed. 1980).
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pendent voices against the other branches of the government, they often
responded by threatening the tenure of the judges. Finally, I will address
this issue with some historical data in the section titled Constitutional
Adjudication and Mutual Support of the Other Branches.
This comparison goes beyond "presenting descriptions of' those
three systems "side by side with no particular end in view."4 It is the
comparison of specific systems incorporated with the social, cultural and
political context of each country. With what social cultural and political
context of Korea does the specific system of the U.S. or Germany coin-
cide? From this standpoint, is the adoption of that system necessary and
in some sense even desirable? Questions such as these reflect the real
value of comparative study.
II. FEDERALISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION SYSTEM
In the U.S. and in Germany we can in a sense say that the constitu-
tional adjudication institution has been developed as an arbitrator in dis-
pute resolution between federal government and state government. On the
contrary, Korea is a unitary state. The question that must be answered
then is: what is and will be the main function of constitutional court in a
unitary state like Korea?
A. The U.S. Supreme Court and Federalism
1. Framers and Federalism
In the confederation period, two schools of thought dominated the
political debate. One group supported a prevalent national government
and favored a judicial arbiter as a method of restraining the states. In
contrast, those who opposed a strong national government supported a
strong judicial system that would provide a capable protector of states'
rights. The proposals made at the Philadelphia Convention empowered
the federal judiciary, thus explaining the absence of states' rights or anti-
Federalist opposition.6 In the Philadelphia Convention, "the nationalists
did not actually oppose the adoption of a judicial arbiter, but merely
thought, as James Wilson later indicated, that a judicial check on the
states would not be sufficient to maintain a strong central government." 7
The legislative history of the first Judiciary Act, the state ratifying
Conventions, and the Philadelphia Convention, provide evidence that the
4. MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS vii (1981).
5. On the comparative method as a scientific approach, see RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET
AL., COMPARATIVE LAW 39-43 (5th ed. 1991).
6. On historical background, see JOHN R. SCHMIDHAUSER, THE SUPREME COURT AS
FINAL ARBITER IN FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 1789-1957 7 (1958).
7. See id. at ll.
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framers clearly intended to empower the Supreme Court by assigning it
the responsibility of supervising the federal system. The first Congress
granted the Supreme Court the appellate jurisdiction necessary to ade-
quately address the Court's responsibility. Many of the powers granted to
the Supreme Court by Congress were founded on the idea of a federal
judicial arbiter, this was accomplished because many of the state ratifying
conventions understood and accepted this concept. The result of the
1786-1789 period is that both schools of thought had accepted the Su-
preme Court as the arbiter in federal-state relations!
2. History of Federalism by the U.S. Supreme Court
Federalism in the U.S. has been developed primarily by the Supreme
Court in the interpretations of the commerce clause and the 10th
Amendment. The commerce clause contributed a basis for extending fed-
eral power, while the 10 th Amendment contributed to the limitation of the
extension of federal power and the protection of state power.
To date, there really have been many decisions on federal and state
power.9 The decisions have depended on the political and historical
situations of the times, and are ample reflections of their economic back-
grounds. As a whole, there have been two main streams in the decisions.
One stream expanded federal power. Its logic has mainly relied on
the interpretation and application of the provision of Article 1, Section 8,
Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution. McCulloch v. Maryland1" in 1819 is the
starting point of this stream. Chief Justice Marshall enunciated the fa-
mous doctrine of implied powers interpreting the "necessary and proper"
or coefficient clause of Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution. With this
case, he established a precedent on the expansion of federal power, as a
whole, for the first time. The Gibbons v. Ogden"1 case in 1824 and Brown
v. Maryland 12 in the Marshall Court also expand federal power. In Gib-
bons, the Court developed the doctrine of the continuous journey. The
Court held that the commerce power of Congress applies to every aspect
of commercial intercourse, including navigation and the power of Con-
gress to regulate interstate commerce, reached into state territory. Under
this doctrine, the commerce power extends to a steamship company oper-
ating within a State if some of the passengers and goods carried on its
ship are on a journey that continues into another State. Brown v. Mary-
8. See id. at 16-17.
9. I do not feel the necessity to analyze each case in detail. For more detailed informa-
tion on these cases, see JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN
FEDERALISM: THE GROWTH OF NATIONAL POWER 82-102 (1992); WILLIAM B. LOCKHART
ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 76-168 (7th ed. 1991).
10. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
II. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 316 1 (1824).
12. See Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 419(1827).
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land struck down a state law levying a fifty-dollar business tax on im-
porters on the ground that the license interfered with foreign commerce.' 3
Marking 1871 as a turning point, after hesitancy during the Chase
Court in the Daniel Ball case, 4 the Court interpreted the commerce clause
broadly and declared the federal law constitutional that regulated the
safety standards of the ships operating within the State boundary of
Michigan. It said the ships were operated in an "intrastate part of an inter-
state journey."' 5 This trend continued in Swift & Co. v. United States.'6
Justice Holmes developed the "current of commerce" rationale by inter-
preting the commerce clause. Under this theory, an activity could be
regulated under the commerce power not because it had an effect on
commerce, but rather, because the activity itself could be viewed as being
"in" commerce or as being part of the "current of commerce."
17
The Court packing plan of President Roosevelt did not come to pass
because of powerful counterforce, but he came to have the Court he
wanted after the Court's change of direction in 1937, and except for fairly
short exceptional periods, it has basically confirmed the federal power on
commerce regulation as an unlimited one until now. It may fairly be said
that the 10th Amendment is not regarded any more as a stronghold of a
power reserved to states. Instead, the Court began to adopt the commerce
clause as the origin of independent federal powers.
The Jones & Laughlin case'" is the epochal example. In pre-1937
cases, the Court had insisted upon a "direct" and "logical" relationship
between the intrastate activity being regulated and interstate commerce.
Yet starting with this case, the Court substantially loosened the nexus
required between the intrastate activity being regulated and interstate
commerce. Because of the multi-state network of operations, the Court
concluded a labor stoppage of the Pennsylvania intrastate manufacturing
operations would have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.'
9
Therefore, labor relations at the Pennsylvania plants could constitution-
ally be regulated by Congress.' ° The Court expressly declined to rely on
the "current of commerce" theory. The Court indicated that "current of
commerce" cases were merely particular, not exclusive, illustrations of
the commerce power." The court also rejected the manufacture-
13. See id at 425.
14. See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
15. See id. at 565.
16. See Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S.375 (1905).
17. See id. at 399.
18. See National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1
(1937).
19. See id. at 41.
20. See id. at 36.
21. See id.
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commerce distinction.2 The Court implied, though it did not expressly
state, that the 10th Amendment would no longer act as an independent
limitation on federal commerce clause powers.'
The Court maintained this approach in the interpretation and appli-
cation of Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Heart of Atlanta Motel case24 and
the McClung case' are examples. Especially in the latter case, the Court
upheld prohibition in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 of racial segregation in
places of public accommodation by applying the Act to a restaurant that
had no known out-of-state customers. There were some reactions against
this stream, which are represented by the National Leagues of Cities
case,26 but the reaction was ended by the famous Garcia case27 written by
Justice Blackmun who has changed his opinion from that of the National
Leagues of Cities case. This case sent shock waves through the States and
local governments. The Court abandoned its functional standard and
stressed that the attempt to draw the boundaries of state regulatory immu-
nity in terms of "traditional governmental function" was not only un-
workable but is inconsistent with established principles of federalism. 2
The concept of "political process" became the logical base.'
The other stream comprehends the decisions that restrict the expan-
sion of federal powers, especially the powers of the Congress, and em-
phasizes the State power, mainly based on the 10th Amendment of the
Constitution. It ironically started from the Marshall Court that basically
supported the expansion of federal power. In Willson v. The Black Bird
Creek Marsh Co.,30 Marshall appeared to concede that a state (Delaware)
could sometimes affect interstate commerce as an incidental consequence
of the exercise of its "police powers."
Roger B. Taney became Marshall's successor as Chief Justice in
1835. He was a strong proponent of the rights of the States. Under his
leadership, there was a reaction against the centralization of powers in the
Congress that was expressed in decisions that can be labeled as "dual
federalism." Cooley v. The Board of Wardens of the Port of
Philadelphia3 is famous for providing a new interpretation of the inter-
state commerce clause of the Constitution in 1851. The Court pointed out
22. See id. at 40.
23. See id. at 30.
24. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
25. See Katzenbach v. McClung 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
26. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
27. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
28. See id. at 531. The established costs for state and local governments to comply with
the federal labor standards in 1986 were approximately $1.1 billion.
29. See id. at 557.
30. See Willson v. The Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (Pet.) 244 (1829).




that Congress has plenary power to regulate interstate and foreign com-
merce, but there were details of commerce of such a local nature that
Congress might allow the details to be regulated by the States.' This was
the so-called concept of "selective exclusiveness."
Chief Justice Taney's most famous decision was issued in 1857 in
Dred Scott v. Sanford.3 Taney ruled that Congress has no right to pro-
hibit any citizen from owning slaves and that the grant of citizenship by a
State to a Negro would not make him a citizen of the U.S. after the Civil
War. The Salmon Chase Court invalidated eight federal laws during the
Chief Justice's term of office. The Court declared the Legal Tender Acts
unconstitutional in Hepburn v. Griswold.34
During the New Deal Crisis (1933-36), the Court invalidated many
federal laws that were means of President Roosevelt's reform.35 The most
significant blow to the New Deal was delivered in the Carter Coal case.
The case invalidated the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 that
set maximum hours and minimum wages for workers in coal mines,
holding that it exceeded Congress' commerce power.36 The Court said
that the employer-employee relationship was a "local relation," and
whatever evils currently characterized that relationship in the coal indus-
tries were all local evils over which the federal government has no legis-
lative control.3 7 These series of decisions made President Roosevelt de-
sign the court packing plan.3"
During the 1970s, there was a big change in the composition of the
U.S. Supreme Court where the Court showed signs of swinging to strong
state power in several decisions.39 This became clear in the National
League of Cities case.' The Court, by a vote of five to four, struck down
amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act applying minimum wage
and overtime pay provisions to non-supervisory employees of state and
local governments on the ground the amendments violated the 10th
Amendment and were a threat to the "separate and independent exis-
32. See id. at 319. In this case, Pennsylvania required that all ships coming into a harbor
must take on a pilot, who must be paid at a fixed rate, to ensure the safe entry of ships into
the harbor. To this date, the Congress allows the States to regulate harbor pilots.
33. See Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 405 (1857).
34- See Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870).
35. See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); Railroad Retirement Board v.
Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 259 U.S. 459
(1935); United States v. Buder, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238
(1936).
36. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 310 (1936).
37. See id. at 308.
38. For details, see discussion infra Part IV.A.
39. See Employees of Dept. of Public Health and Welfare v. Missouri, 411 U.S. 279
(1973); Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
40. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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tence" of these governments."
After Garcia42, some limits still exist on Congress' commerce clause
powers as the result of a landmark 1995 decision in U.S. v. Lopez.43 In
this case, the Court for the first time in 60 years invalidated a federal stat-
ute on the ground that it was beyond Congress' commerce power." In a
5-4 vote, the Court struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990
in which Congress made it a federal crime for any individual knowingly
to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knew, or had reasonable
cause to believe, was a school zone. The Court held that it is not enough
that the activity being regulated merely affects interstate commerce. In-
stead, the activity must "substantially" affect interstate commerce.4
In summary, except for some exceptional periods, federal power has
continuously expanded so much that we can say American constitutional
history is comprised of the expanding federal powers. Now, doubts on
whether a realm reserved by the 10th Amendment for the states really
exists seem to be consistent with the expression, not "The United States
of America" but "A United State of America."'
The various factors47 that give logical justification to the expanding
of federal power are increasing rapidly. From this standpoint, it may be a
logical conclusion that there appears to be a big difference between the
federalism of today's constitutional system and the federalism intended
by the framers. With the Rehnquist Court's effort to recover state's
power, some limitations on federal power are forecasted. However, for
the long run, this will be just the temporary passing phase and the ex-
panding of federal power might be the irrevocable tendency. In short, the
power of U.S. Supreme Court as a final arbiter in Federal-State relations
has been strong thus far.
B. The German Constitutional Court and Federalism
1. Federalism in German Constitutional Law
The federal state system in German Constitutional Law divides the
problems of the nation into federal government and states. It allows both
systems to exercise their influence upon the other system. The medium
41. See id. at 845.
42. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
43. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
44. See id. at 567. See also, WILLIAM COHEN & JONATHAN D. VARAT, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 15-32 (9th ed. 1995).
45. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995).
46. See Potter Stewart, Federalism: The National Government Versus The States, IN THE
CoNsTrrurION: THAT DELICATE BALANCE 125 (W. Friendly & M. Elliott eds. 1984).
47. These include the problem of pollution, labor in the national level, education and pro-




by which the states influence the federal government is the Senat (the
Senate in Germany). States participate in the federal legislation and ad-
ministration via the Senat.' Nevertheless, the Senat is not an organization
that represents the states, rather is a federal organization.'
To the federal government, influencing the states is controlled by
Article 28, Section 3 of the German Constitution, which provides for fed-
eral control, federal constraint and federal intervention. In terms of fed-
eral control,5' the federal government supervises the state's execution of
federal law. This control is restricted to the scope of legal suitability pre-
scribed in Article 84, Section 3 of the German Constitution. When this is
not enough, the federal government can use federal constraint. With con-
sent of the federal senate, the federal government can take action to make
the state perform its duty. And for its execution, the federal government
has direct power over the states. 1 Lastly, the federal government has the
traditional device of federal intervention when its basic order of free de-
mocracy becomes endangered.52 The federal senate intervenes decisively
here as well. For these reasons, the federal government and states are
more closely connected than superficial observation might suggest, and
more weight is given to the central government.
German Constitutional Law (Grundgesetz) has many other provi-
sions on federalism. Among them, Article 84, Section 1 prescribes inter-
action between the Senat and the Federal Constitutional Court (Vervas-
sungsgericht) in Germany. The execution of administrative action is en-
trusted to the states as their inherent duty. This is also true with the en-
forcement of federal laws.53 In this case, federal government restricts
control within the narrow scope of so-called legal suitability.54 This en-
abled the Senat to increase its power over states through federal laws.
because the Federal Constitutional Court held that Senat's consent was
required for federal laws governing matters falling within the basic re-
sponsibilities of the states.
German Constitutional Law lays emphasis on state rather than fed-
eral government in the work division of judicial power.5 The Constitu-
tion provides for federal supreme courts, including federal constitutional
48- Ch. IV, art. 50 GG.
49. On the character of the German Federal Senate, see KONRAD HEESE, GRUNDZUGE DES
VERFASSUNGSRECHTS DER :BUNDESREPUBLIC Deutschland [Basic Principles of German
Constitutional Law] 166-75 (Heidelberg: C.F. Miller Juristischer Verlag, 1984).
50. On the scope of federal control, see M. Bullinger, Der Anvendungsbereich der Bunde-
saufsicht [Scope of Federal Control] 83 AoR 279, 282-96 (1958).
51. Ch. II, art. 37 GG.
52. Id. at ch. VIII, art. 91,
53. Id. at art. 83.
54. Id. at art. 84 (3).
55. Id. at ch. IX, art. 92.
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courts that mainly address final decisions. The federal government can
establish federal courts for the protection of commercial rights and mili-
tary affairs. The remaining courts are state courts. State courts can exer-
cise federal judicial power pursuant to Article 96, Section 5 of the Con-
stitution. However, almost all of the substantive and procedural laws ap-
plied by the court, in addition to organizational laws that include regula-
tions of judges, are primarily federal laws today. Therefore, judicial inde-
pendence and other principles that form standards of decisions are devel-
oped by the precedents of the federal constitutional court and the other
federal supreme courts. In this area, state courts have no power.
2. Federal Government-Friendly and Federal Constitutional Court
The doctrine of federal government-friendly is the unwritten consti-
tutional doctrine that regulates German federalism. 6 Under this doctrine,
Constitutional Law not only requires the federal government and states to
perform their constitutional duties but also requires the states to inces-
santly pursue and build up a good neighborly relationship of federal gov-
ernment hostile attitude (Gegeneinander) can be unconstitutional even
though state action is based on formal positive law.
It is the Federal Constitutional Court that gives basic significance to
the federal state system in Constitutional Law. According to the Court's
opinion, constitutional duties that are stipulated expressly in the text and
specific supplementary duties of states to federal government and of fed-
eral government to states derive from this doctrine. In addition, this doc-
trine gives basis to the specific limitations of the powers that are granted
to the federal government and states by the Constitution as well as spe-
cific limitation on procedure. When a federal government or state does
not respect these duties and limitations, the action becomes unconstitu-
tional.57 Though the power of dispute resolution is given to the Federal
Constitutional Court, misgivings do in fact exist.
The doctrine of federal government-friendly seems to be improper as
a standard decision for federal disputes when this dispute is not a true
federal dispute, but a dispute between political lines that is resolved by
constitutional adjudication under the name of federal dispute." In this
occasion, demanding loyalty or at least friendly attitude to the federal
56. See KONRAD HEESE, GRUNDZUGE DES VERFASSUNGSRECTS DER :BuNDESREPUBLIC
Deutschland [Basic Principles of German Constitutional Law] 168 (Hee-Yol Kay trans.,
Seoul: Sam-Young Sa, 1987). For details on this doctrine, see H.W. BAYER,
DIEBUNDESTREUE (1961); Gebh Miller, Bundestreue in Bundesstaat, in F7-IRUNG UND
BILDUNG IN DER HEUTIGEN WELT [GUIDANCE AND FORMATION IN THE WORLD OF TODAY]
213-216 (1964).
57. On the cases to which this doctrine is applied, see BVerfGE 12, 205; BVerfGE 13, 54.
58. This is evident especially in BVerfGE 6, 309-28 (Konkordat case), 8 122-47 (Volks-
befragung case) and 12, 205-22 (Femseh case).
[Vol. 6:123
KOREAN CONSTI9JMONAL COURT
government is not an appropriate response to this dispute. This is because
democratic order in Constitutional Law is clearly premising the conflicts
among various political lines. The federal Constitutional Court does not
have the competence in this type of political decision despite the fact the
decision of the Constitutional Court cannot be separated from a political
factor. This is the functional limitation of the Constitutional Court.
The power of the German Federal Constitutional Court as a final ar-
biter in federal relations was not as strong as the U.S. Supreme Court.
Geographically, Germany has fewer states than the U.S., and the power
distribution between federal and states has not proven to be problematic
as a result of the constitutional doctrine of federal government-friendly.
C. The Korean Constitutional Court and Judicial Activism
1. Korea as a Unitary State
Korea has not adopted a federal system, rather is based on the unitary
system of government. In the unitary form, one central government
wields supreme power over all territorial divisions within the nation.
Provinces, cities, and other political units owe their creation and contin-
ued existence to the central government, and they possess only such pow-
ers as the central government grants to them. The central government can
make broad or limited delegation of powers to lower levels of govern-
ment. Unitary governments are the most common form in the world, and
subnational governments are viewed primarily as administrative subdivi-
sions to carry out national policies. Commonly, the central government
prescribes in minute detail the policies to be implemented and the proce-
dures to be followed. Since the lower level units are subject to continuous
supervision and control, the unitary organization is able to achieve a de-
gree of national homogeneity, provide uniformity of policy and admini-
stration, and concentrate power swiftly and completely in time of war.
The major disadvantage of a unitary system may be its inflexibility.
Identical policies and methods are applied to all local conditions regard-
less of their applicability in specific areas.
2. Historical and Political Background
As Korea has never adopted the federal state system, the role of final
arbiter in federal-state relations cannot be applied to the Korean Consti-
tutional Court. Then, what is the necessity and main role of the Constitu-
tional Court in Korea? Surveying the political and social background in
its creation can supply us with an answer.
During the public hearings for the 1980 Constitution, the majority
advocated a judicial review system by the courts, namely, the American
system. While some called for revival of the short-lived Constitutional
Court of the Second Republic, few supported the adoption of the Consti-
tutional Committee. This seemed to have been due to the disappointing
1999]
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performance of the Committee under the Fourth Republic (1972-1980)
which, though a permanent organ, did not make a single decision on con-
stitutionality.
In a new move of the times to usher into a more democratic order
which is usually referred to as the "June 29 Declaration," a far-reaching
amendment was undertaken to introduce reforms across the board. The
Constitutional Court first adopted judicial review in the 1960 Constitu-
tion, and has since been reinstated. It is much too soon to make an as-
sessment, but an amplified Constitutional Court may be the most suitable
under prevailing conditions. 9 Since the government authorities have not
officially released the deliberation records for the amendment, it is not
known in detail why and how the Constitutional Court plan was adopted.
However, based on the materials and records of journals at that time,
we can say that it was the outcome of political compromise without deep
knowledge of the system. At that time, revision of the Constitution was
the object of a political deal. The six representatives of three political
parties gathered what Koreans called a six member petit committee, and
deliberated the revision. In the course of this deliberation, the opposition
party insisted on the Constitutional Court system, disappointed at the
Constitutional Committee system, and the Majority party admitted it get-
ting concession from the opposition party on other issues. There was no
deep knowledge and close examination of the Constitutional Court sys-
tem represented by the German Federal Constitutional Court.
Be that as it may, the Korean Constitutional Court has done better
than was expected. In Korea, where a federal system is not adopted, the
main role of the Constitutional Court is not a final arbiter in federal-state
relations, but to directly protect the constitutional rights of the people by
the interpretation of the Constitution under the unitary state system. Fed-
eralism does not play a significant role.
III. INSTITUTIONAL COMPARISON
A. The Composition of Constitutional Adjudication Institutions in the
U.S., Germany and Korea
1. The U.S. o
a. Organization of the U.S. Supreme Court
The most dazzling jewel in the judicial crown of the U.S. is the re-
59. The erstwhile Constitution Committee was more in name than in reality. The ordinary
court which was given the job of judicial review under the 1962 Constitution was overly
politicized, For more detail of the history of judicial review in Korea, see DAE-KYu LAw
AND POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN SOUTH KOREA 151-70 (1990).Yoon,
60. On the composition of the U.S. Supreme Court, see LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME
COURT 25-32 (2d ed. 1981); W. H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 253-75
(1 987);R.W.GALLOWAY, The Rich and The Poor, in SUPREME COURT HISTORY (1982).
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vered and often controversial U.S. Supreme Court. It is the sole court
mentioned specifically in Article III or in any part of the Constitution. All
other federal courts have been created by statute.6' In the U.S., constitu-
tional questions are brought up as a subject matter of general civil, crimi-
nal and administrative cases and judged together with the accompanying
issues of the case. Thus eventually, Constitutional Law comes to work as
a judicial norm in all kinds of courts.
It is therefore false to say that the U.S. Supreme Court is the only
institution of constitutional adjudication. The Supreme Court, more pre-
cisely, has the right of final authoritative interpretation. In this research,
however, I will compare constitutional adjudication institutions at the
highest level, so I will restrict its scope to the U.S. Supreme Court.62 In
the U.S. Supreme Court, there are no special inner organizations or pro-
cedural regulations concerning judicial review. The Supreme Court sim-
ply administers the process of judicial review according to the provisions
that prescribe its jurisdiction and its general procedures.'
b. Fixed Number of Judges and their Tenure of Office
The Supreme Court of the U.S. is composed of one Chief Justice and
eight Associate Justices.' Ranging from five to eight Justices in the first
eighty years of its history, the Court has remained at nine ever since the
first term of President Grant in 1869.' This odd number makes it unlikely
that tie votes will occur. When a tie vote does occur, the decision of the
lower court from which appeal has been taken to the Supreme Court is
affirmed.'
61. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 177 (5th ed. 1986).
62. We frequently put the Supreme Courts of Korea and the U.S. at the same level when
referring to their power and procedural statutes. This false approach derived not only from
the methodological mistake, but also from the lack of understanding of the judicial organiza-
tion of the U.S.
63. On the jurisdiction and adjudication procedures and their provisions, see discussion
infra Part HLA. 1-2.
64. Art.l. of the Judiciary and Judicial Procedure.
65. See ABRAHAM, supra note 61, at 177. The Court has continued with nine Justices
since 1869. Prior to this time, its membership was fixed by Congress, and comprised five in
1789, six in 1790, seven in 1807, nine in 1837, ten in 1863, and eight in 1866. Recently there
has not been a big argument about the number of Justices in the U.S. Supreme Court, but
rather some arguments concerning the desirable number of judges at the federal appellate
court level. Compare Stephen Reinhardt, Too Few Judges, Too many Cases, A.B.A. J., Jan.
1993, at 52 (insisting upon expansion of the numbers) with Gerald B. Tjoflat, More Judges,
Less Justice, ABA. J., July 1993, at 70-73 (objecting to a numerical increase for several
reasons).
66. The Justices in the U.S. Supreme Court try, under this circumstance, try to persuade
the last justice to come to their side to formulate a majority opinion. See, BOB WOODWARD
& ScOTr" ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT (1979).
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Tenure of the Justices is not fixed, thus they can hold an office for
life, unless they are removed due to impeachment or conviction.' There-
fore, mandatory retirement at a certain age does not exist. Only under
certain circumstances can Justices retire of their own will. In this situa-
tion, the Justice is paid as much as the amount of their retirement pension
calculated after their retirement.' Detailed provisions concerning the re-
tirement of the justices are found in Articles 371 to 376 of the Judiciary
and Judicial Procedure Act. Essential to the independence of the judiciary
is the security of tenure, particularly in the case of appointed judges.'
The splendid rhetoric, "judicial independence," would be mocked and
derided without the armor of "a long term of office, preferably life, ade-
quate remuneration, and stringent constitutional and/or statutory safe-
guards against removal."7° There is no promotional or rotational appoint-
ment system of the United States Supreme Court.
c. Selection of Justices and their Qualifications
(1) Appointment of Justices
"The President shall nominate, and, by and with the advice and con-
sent of the senate, shall appoint Justices of the Supreme Court."7 When
67. See ABRAHAM, supra note 61 at 44. "In accordance with constitutional requirements,
impeachment for 'Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors' may be [initi-
atedl by a simple majority of the members of the House of Representatives, there being a
quorum on the floor. Trial is then held in the Senate, which may convict by a vote of two-
thirds of the members of the Senate present and voting, if a quorum is present." Id.
68. The revision of the retirement statute was the inducement for the early retirement:
"Partly to enable aging jurists to step down from the bench with dignity, and concurrently to
render their replacement with younger personnel more palatable, Congress enacted a vastly
improved retirement statute in 1937." See supra note 48, at 42. Under the provisions of this
retirement statute, federal judges may retire on full pay at the age of seventy after having
served ten years on the bench, or at sixty-five after having served fifteen years. See id. at 42-
43. However, physical disability was the waiver for the requirements: "These requirements
are waived in the presence of physical disability, in which case retirement pay is computed in
accordance with length of service." Id. at 43. A more accurate description than retirement is
to "enter inactive status," subject to temporary calls to duty at the discretion of the Chief
Justice of the Court. Id. at 42.
69. Life tenure would provide "that independent spirit in the judges...essential to the faith-
ful performance of so arduous a duty." Charles J. Cooper, The Federal Judiciary, Life Ten-
ure, and Self-Government, 4 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 500, 501 (1995) (quoting THE
FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). Besides,
"Life tenure would place the judges 'in a situation altogether unprecedented in a free coun-
try,' rendering them independent in the fullest sense of the word. There is no power above
them, to control any of their decisions." Id. (quoting Brutus, N.Y. J., Jan. 31, 1788, reprinted
in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FDERALIST 407, 418 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
70. See ABRAHAM, supra note 61, at 41.
71. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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the office of Chief Justice is vacant, the President may appoint a Chief
Justice among the existing Justices filling that vacancy with a new Jus-
tice, or can appoint a new Chief Justice directly from the outside. The
latter has been the common choice."
The formal legal procedure for the appointment of Justices is as fol-
lows: Presidential nomination, Judiciary Committee's decision on
whether or not to transmit it to the plenary session, majority approval in
the plenary session of the Senate, and Presidential appointment.
First, the President designates and proclaims a justice nominee and
notifies the Senate.73 The Senate Judiciary Committee decides whether or
not to approve the nominee. If the committee disapproves after screening
the fitness of the nominee, the nomination is rejected. If the committee
approves, it is transmitted to the plenary session. The Senate decides by
majority vote whether or not to confirm. While the legal process of ap-
pointing Justices is comparatively simple, gaining legitimacy for ap-
pointments is not. Ensuring democratic values in appointments is
achieved by understanding the doctrine of democracy and demonstrating
the level of American democracy. This effort is made through a hearing,74
testimony, and investigation, which is done during the approval proce-
dure but can be made outside of these official procedures as well.
Efforts outside of the official process are usually made by so-called
unofficial participants. These unofficial participants are generally divided
into three groups. The first consists of the American Bar Association
(ABA)75 and legal professional groups, the second consists of interest
groups and pressure groups outside of law circles, and the last is com-
prised of the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court themselves. These unof-
ficial participants are involved in the whole process of judicial appoint-
ments in diverse ways.
First, the President not only listens to the opinion of staff and law
officers who assist him in the White House, but also refers to the infor-
72. For statistical material, see COMMISSION ON THE BICENTENNIAL OF THE U.S.
CONSTIrUTION, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS BEGINNINGS & ITS
JUSTICES 1790-1991 278-81 (1992).
73. See STEPHEN L. WASBY, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM
117 (5th ed. 1993). Washy explains that "some presidents appear to have had few expecta-
tions of their nominees, but others have placed justices on the Court to do a specific job." He
enumerates as examples of the latter Justice Thurgood Marshall by President Lyndon John-
son, and Chief Justice Warren Burger by President Nixon. See id. at 117-21.
74- There are controversies on whether the hearing in the Senate undermines the Court's
credibility. See Stephen J. Wermiel, Appointment Controversies and the Supreme Court, 84
Nw. U. L REV. 1033, 1034-36 (1990).
75. In the ABA's work for this, confidentiality is said to be very important. About its
actual operation, see Joan M. Hall, The Role of the ABA Standing Committee on the Federal
Judiciary, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 980,981-82 (1990).
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mation and materials that are collected by the FBI and the opinions of
politicians. These sources are used in various ways based on the style of
the President. Once a nominee is designated and proclaimed by the Presi-
dent, various kinds of citizens' groups and pressure groups that have an
interest in the appointment develop lobbying activities to voice their
opinions.
At this stage, the Standing Committee of the Federal Judiciary, affili-
ated with the ABA, also launches a comprehensive evaluation operation
of the nominee.76 It collects extensive data for judging the fitness of the
nominee and brings out the results of its analysis in its opinion. Even
though there have been differences according to the President's political
style and methods of dealing with the Senate, ABA opinions have been
influential in the President's nominee withdrawal' and the Senate's ap-
proval procedures. Because these procedures present themselves as a
living example of democracy in practice, they show various aspects of
how political powers are arranged and what the political situations are at
a given time. Therefore, the appointment procedure cannot be fixed in a
definite form, and is arguably complicated." Nonetheless, all of these
procedures can be summarized as an effort to have a sincere Justice for
the people. The U.S. method of judicial appointment is becoming a good
model for securing legitimacy and democratic justification in composing
constitutional adjudication institutions.
(2) Qualifications
The U.S. Constitution says nothing about qualifications of the jus-
tices. To date, around forty of the Justices had not had a legal profes-
sional career at the time of their appointment, although all the Justices
had been lawyers. In the past, political figures were appointed as Chief
Justice and Justices, but since the 1970s, there has been a tendency for
these positions to be filled by judges of the lower courts. Many of the
Justices come from distinguished families. More recently, more of them
have come from prestigious schools such as Harvard, Yale and
Columbia.79
Ultimately, we can say that qualifications of the Justices actually
become clear during the nomination procedure by the President and ap-
proval procedure by the Senate. No legal qualifications exist; rather fac-
tual democratic procedure dominates the appointment procedure. Each
76. See id. at 982.
77. See WASBY, supra note 73, at 106-10.
78. Political parties play an important role in these procedures. When the President is of
one party and the Senate majority is of the other party, Justice appointments must be a com-
promise between the two parties.




Justice's own sense of value and view of life exert a large influence upon
his or her adjudication.s'
2. Germany81
a. Organization of the Federal Constitutional Court
The Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) in
Germany consists of two independent chambers (Senat), with each Senat
is composed of eight judges.8 2 Because these two Senat, named "Erster
Senat" and "Zweite Senat", stand in a independent relationship with each
other, they cannot exchange members and the judge of one Senat cannot
execute the work of the other Senat as a proxy. For this reason the Fed-
eral Constitutional Court (hereinafter FCC) is also referred to as "twin
courts" (Zwillinggericht).3
The head and vice head of the FCC should each belong to one Sen-
ate, becoming the chief judge of each Senat.84 Each Senat takes charge of
certain subjects as laid down in Article 14 of the Federal Constitutional
Court Code (FCCC) and they adjust subjects between the two Senat by
decision of the entire assembly (Plenum), where the two Senat take seats
together. This decision does not take effect until the next term of the
court in principle."5 When there is any doubt as to which Senat has com-
petence in a specific procedure, the question is decided by a committee
composed of the head, vice head, and four judges who are appointed by
the two Senat for one term of the court. In case of a tie, the chief of the
committee shall decide the issue. 6
As stated above, each Senat takes charge of different subjects, based
80. We can understand the fact that the outcome of the Supreme Court's adjudication is
decided by the arrangements of conservative, neutral, and radical power in the Supreme
Court. See Ralph Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, in IS THE
SUPREME COURT THE GUARDIAN OF THE CONSTITUTION? 98, 133-135 (Robert A. Licht
ed., 1993).
81. For more on the composition of Verfassungsgericht in Germany, see GRUNDGESER
(1994); K. Schlaich, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht in VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT IN
WESTEUROPA [CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION POWER IN WEST EUROPEi 24-38 (C.
Starck & A. Weber ed., 1985); E. BEND AND E. KLEIN, LEHRBUCH DES
VERFASSUNGSPROZERECHT [TEXTBOOK OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURE AcTI 36-42
(1991); C. PESTALOZZA, VERFASSUNGSPROZERECHT 32-38 (1982); H. Simon, Verfas-
sungsgerichtsbarkeit in HANDBUCH DES VERFASSUNGSRECHTS 1254-67 (E. Benda, et al.
eds., 1983); T. MAUNZ, ET AL., BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTSGESETZ [FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT ACT] art. 1-16 (1990).
82. See Art.2 BVerfGE.
83. See David S. Clark, The Selection and Accountability of Judges in West Germany:
Implementation ofa Rechtstaat, 61 S. CAL. L REv. 1795, 1826-27 (1988).
84. See Art.9, § I FCCC; Art.15 § 1 FCCC.
85. See id. atart.14, §4 FCCC.
86. See id. atart.14, §5 FCCC.
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on a strict doctrine of independence. In some sense each Senat fulfills the
function of one whole FCC. Therefore, when one Senai adjudicates a
particular case, the other Senat may not readjudicate that case. In case
one Senat wants to have a different legal interpretation from that of the
other Senat, a Plenary Judgment (Plenarentscheidung) rendered by both
Senats sitting together is employed to resolve the difference. This serves
as a device for the unity of FCC's judgment.
b. Quorum and Tenure of Judges
While each Senat is composed of eight judges, the FCC consists of
sixteen judges. The tenure of office of each judges is twelve years, and
they are automatically retired upon reaching a certain age limit even if it
is before the completion of their term of office. The age limit is the last
day of the judge's sixty-eighth year of age.87 The judge shall not be able
to be reappointed. Even though a judge's term of office is completed, a
predecessor shall retain his office until a successor is appointed.88 In case
a judge withdraws from his office due to his death, age limit, discharge,
etc., the legislature, which selects the retiree, has to select the successor.
The term of the successor is not the residuary term, rather twelve years
from his selection. 9
c. Selection, Qualifications, and Appointment of Judges
(1) Qualifications of the Judges
To be selected as a judge of the FCC, one should meet certain condi-
tions. First, one should be more than forty years old. Second, one should
have eligibility for Congress and express one's intention to be a judge to
the FCC in writing. Third, one should satisfy the qualification ordained in
the German Judiciary Act. The qualifications are granted to law profes-
sors9° and persons who graduated from a college of law and passed the
National Exam. This blocks participation of specialists who lack judicial
qualifications.9 Fourth, three judges in each Senat should be selected
87. See DONALD KOMMERS, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN WEST GERMANY: A STUDY OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 87 (1976).
88. See art.4, §§ 1-4.
89. See id. at art. 5, § 3.
90. See Ruggero J. Aldisert, Rambling Through Continental Legal Systems, 43 U. PITT. L.
REV. 935, 952 (1982). In Germany, the position of law professor is very high while Germans
have antipathy to the judicial offices. "It has fallen upon the German university community,
not the German judiciary, to expound on the interstices of the code, to interpret ambiguities,
to fill the lacunae," and "the great names of the common law are those of judges, but the
great names of civil law are those of scholars." Id.
91. See Clark, supra note 83, at 1827. In the detailed explanation on the FCC in his fa-
mous book, Kommers shows the statistics that through 1972 the immediate previous job of
the judges appointed were as follows: judge (41%), civil servant (28%), legislator (17%), law
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from Federal Supreme Court judges,92 and in this case the judges should
have a judicial career for at least three years in a federal court.93 Prevalent
in the composition of the FCC is active participation by law professors. A
majority of the German law professors pass the National Exam and gain
admission to the bar.
(2) Drawing up the List of Candidates
The Minister of Justice should finish drawing up two lists of eligible
candidates a week prior to the selection date.94 One list is a name of all
the federal highest court's judges95 who are eligible to be an FCC judge.
The other is a list of candidates who are recommended by negotiating
bodies (Fraktionen) in Congress and the federal and state governments.
In the case that a successor is not selected at the expiration of predeces-
sor's office and not selected within a legal term before the expiration, the
FCC should recommend a candidate upon the request of the most senior
member of the Judge Selecting Committee. In this case, if one judge is to
be selected, three candidates should be recommended and if more than
two judges are needed, a double number of candidates should be recom-
mended.96
(3) Selection and Appointment
Sixteen judges are selected. Eight judges are selected by the Senate
(Bundesrat) and eight judges are selected by the Congress (Bundesiag).97
Senate and Congress are not limited to the list of the recommended
names. The Bundestag appoints the "Judge Selection Committee" which
consists of twelve congressmen selected according to the proportion of
the number of congressman in each Fraktion determined by the d'Hont
method of calculation. This committee selects eight judges. A judge
should gain more than eight votes. It is a kind of indirect election.98
The committee carries out its duties under its own decision and re-
professor (11%), and attorney (2%). There have been arguments on the issue that judiciary
qualification is laid down as a qualification to become a judge of the FCC from its enact-
ment.
92. "The remaining five members may also come from federal judgeships or be Volljuris-
ten in other careers." See Clark supra note 83, at 1827.
93. See art. 2, § 3 FCCC.
94. See id. at art.8.
95. This includes: Federal Civil & Criminal Highest Labor Court, Federal Administrative
Court, Federal Taxation Court, Federal Labor Court, and Federal Society Court.
96. See art.7(a) FCCC.
97. About the relationship between the FCC and Bundestag, see Wolfgang Zeidler, The
Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany: Decisions on the Consti-
tutionality of Legal Norms, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 501,522-24(1987).
98. See art.6, §§ 1-2 FCCC.
1999l
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
sponsibility. German basic law (Grundgeseiz) does not lay down this sort
of indirect election method, but the FCCC does. This indirect election
method encounters criticism that the Judge Selection Committee does not
really consists of appropriate figures as expected and the opinion of small
political parties is neglected by adopting the d'Hondt calculation method.
Bundesrat selects eight judges with more than a two-third consent of vot-
ers
.9
The Bundesrat and Bundestag alternate choosing the president and
vice president of the FCC among the judges.'00 The provision that de-
mands the consent of greater than two-thirds consent of the voters in
judge elections has the positive aspect that it contributes to the protection
of the minority like the opposition party and further meets the needs of
democratic justification demanded in the composition of the constitu-
tional court. On the other hand, it also has a negative aspect in that it can
induce political conflict. There were some arguments over the method of
judge selection in Bundesrat when the revision of Grundgesetz was dis-
cussed.
The person elected by the Bundesrat or Bundestag is appointed by
the President.' 1 The judge has to take an oath prescribed in law at the
time of his appointment." ° By this appointment, the candidate eventually
acquires the position of a judge in the FCC, and the term of office starts
from this day.
(4) Prohibition of Holding Other Offices at the Same Time
A judge of the FCC cannot belong to the Bundesrat, Bundestag, or
federal government. Nor can he belong to the equivalent constitutional
organization at the State (Land) level. Additionally, other offices cannot
be held, regardless of whether they are public or private, with the excep-
tion of law professor.
3. Korea
(1) Influence of the U.S.
Generally speaking, at the time the U.S. Constitution began to have
an effect on Korea, the American-educated elite came back to Korea and
began to contribute to the formulation of Korean Constitutional Law. Due
to the numerous Koreans that have studied in the U.S.,"W the transplanta-
99. See id. at art.7. See also Clark, supra note 83, at 1828. According to Prof. Clark, the
German legislature plays a dominant role in the selection of FCC judges, and it is justified
because "it bestows democratic legitimacy on the selection process and on the judges them-
selves, and second, the best qualified jurists for constitutional adjudication are chosen." Id.
100. See art.9, § 1 FCCC.
101. See id. atartlO.
t02. Seeid.atart.ll.
103. See, Dong Suh Bark, The American-Educated Elite in Korean Society in KOREA AND
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tion of the U.S. system into Korea cannot be neglected. We can say, how-
ever, that the most profound effect on Korean Constitutional Law came
from the American military regime."° The effect of U.S. Constitutional
Law and its precedents have been continued, either directly from the U.S.
or indirectly via European countries. In the realm of constitutional adju-
dication institutions, the effect up with the changes in the Korean Con-
stitutional Law provisions."05 The present Korean Constitution (Sixth Re-
public, 1987-present) has the Korean Constitutional Court as its constitu-
tional adjudication institution, which can be said to have been created to
some degree under the influence of the U.S.
First, in staffing the judiciary, the fixed number of judges and the
general organization, the Korean Constitution says, "the Constitutional
Court shall be composed of nine adjudicators."' 6 Unlike the German
system, the Court is not divided into chambers, rather more closely re-
sembles the United States with nine Justices. However, to nullify a legal
norm in Korea more than six judges should assent, so the meaning of the
number "9" is different from the U.S. in forming the Court's opinion.
107
The number has been changed from I1 (first republic) to nine in Korea,
and the organization has never been divided into different chambers. A
possible explanation is to centralized the competence in a unified com-
U.S.: A CENTURY OF COOPERATION 263, 265-67 (1984).
104. Just after the emancipation from Japan, the American military was stationed in South
Korea from 1945 to 1948, and they affected deeply the formation of the Korean legal system,
including Korean Constitutional Law, by making and implementing military laws and ordi-
nances which were based on the U.S. legal system. See TCHEoLSU KIM,
HANKUIKHUNBUBSA [History of Korean Constitution] 55-66 (1989).
105. So far Korea has had six republics and nine revisions of its Constitutional Law. In
constitutional adjudication institutions, there have been some changes occurring side by side
with the changes of republic. The first republic had a Constitutional Committee, which was
composed of the Vice President (head), Five Supreme Court judges, and five Congressmen.
Its character was a combination of a constitutional court and political organization styles.
The second republic established a Korean Constitutional Court that mainly imitated the Ger-
man Constitutional Court system. It consisted of nine judges who were selected three each by
the President, Supreme Court and the Senate. In actuality the Court itself, however, was not
established due to the military overthrow in 1961. The third republic had an Impeachment
Committee, which was composed of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (head), three
Justices of Supreme Court and five Congressmen. The fourth and fifth republic had a Con-
stitutional Committee again, but the way of justice selection was different from that of the
first republic and rather similar to that of the Constitutional Court of the second republic. The
sixth republic established the Korean Constitutional Court, which is nearly same with that of
second republic in the way of composition, except that the Senate is changed to the National
Assembly. See YOUNG-SUNG KWON, HUNBUB14AK WONLON [CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: A
TEXTBOOK] 1144-46 (Rev. ed., 1994).
106, S. KOREA CONST. Art I 11, § 2.
107. ABRAHAM, supra note 61, at 177.
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mittee or court and to enhance its power and dignity.
Second, the right of appointment is given to the President like the
U.S. and Germany, but the selecting process is different from those two
countries and, at least, closer to that of the U.S. in that a special non-
standing committee, like Judge Selection Committee in Germany, is not
established for the nomination. Basically, the nine judges are nominated
three each by the President, National Assembly and Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court.'"
Third, the KCC has only a single head like the U.S. and does not
have a vice-head like Germany. The head has the same rights as the other
Justices in the adjudication process. He represents the whole court and
directs the Court's administration. He should be appointed not by the As-
semblies (Germany) but by the President (the U.S.). However, he should
be appointed from among the judges and he is the only one who should
get the concurrence of the National Assembly in appointment. 9 At this
point we can say that in appointing the Justices the power of the President
is excessively large and outside of the Assembly's adequate control in
Korea.
(2) Influence of Germany
Korean law has been generally associated with the Roman-German
legal family Gustav Radbruch (1878-1949), one of the twentieth cen-
tury's leading figures in legal philosophy. Radbruch introduced in one of
his books an important theme for research in legal sociology-the recep-
tion of Roman law in Korea."' Generally speaking, the Korean legal
system can be classified as belonging to the civil law family, which has
been deeply affected by Germany. We can enumerate many reasons for
this, especially historical background. In some aspects, Korea began its
reception of western law on a full scale during the Japanese invasion pe-
riod (1910-1945)."'
At the time the Japanese legal system was the German system. The
German legal system could be adopted indirectly to Korea via Japan.
Many legal scholars have studied law in Germany, for many reasons." In
108. "Of the adjudicators [referred] to in Sec.2., three shall be selected from among persons
chosen by the National Assembly, with the remaining three to be selected by the Chief Jus-
tice." S. KOREA CONST. Art 111, § 2.
109- "The head of the Constitutional Court shall be appointed by the President from among
the adjudicators with the concurrence of the National Assembly." Id. at Art 111, § 4.
110. G. RADBRUCH, VORSCHULE DER RECHTSPHILOsaPHiE 51 (1948).
111. There can be many refutations, but pay attention to the expressions, "in a sense" and
"on a full scale." See Byoung Ho Park, Traditional Korean Society and Law 5 KOREAN J.
COMP. L 1, 3-26 (1977); Chongko Choi, On the Reception of Western Law in Korea, 9
KOREAN J. OF COMP. L. 141, 158-67 (1981).
112. See Chongko Choi, History of German-Korean Relationship Through Legal Science,
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the area of constitutional adjudication institutions, the effect of Germany
was not so large as compared to the U.S. in the beginning. However, from
the adoption of the so-called "Constitutional Court" system in the second
republic of Korea many German factors have been imported into the Ko-
rean system.
First, in the organization of the judiciary, Korea has the KCC beside
the general court system that is headed by Korean Supreme Court. There-
fore, the Constitutional Court in Korea is a kind of special court like the
one in Germany. "3 It makes final decisions in constitutional disputes.
Thus in constitutional matters, by and large, it can be the highest court.
However, there are some jurisdictional conflicts between the Korean
Constitutional Court and the Korean Supreme Court caused by the partial
adoption of the German system." 4
Second, in the tenure of judges, Korea has both tenure and age limits
like Germany, even though its specific number is different. The tenure
office of judge is six years"5 (twelve years in Germany) and the age limit
is sixty-five for Justices and seventy for the Chief Justice." 6 As in Ger-
many, Justices are automatically retired upon reaching the age limit even
though it is before the completion of their term of office. The difference
is that they can be re-appointed, unlike Germany.
Third, qualifications of the Korean Justices are specified in relatively
detailed legal and constitutional provisions which are very similar to
those of Germany. The Justices should have qualifications to be a judicial
officer" 7 and are appointed among persons who are more than forty years
old and who have worked more than fifteen years in one of the following
jobs: Judge, public prosecutor, lawyer, legal work in a national organiza-
tion (national and public corporations government-invested corporation)
with lawyer's license, and law professors at an accredited law school with
a lawyer's license."' The biggest difference with Germany lies in the
2 RECHT IN DEUTSCHLAND IAND KOREA 83, 96-112 (1980).
113. There is, however, a refutation that the classification of the constitutional adjudication
system into special court type and general court type is meaningless. In the case of the U.S.,
although the U.S. Supreme Court is the head of the general court, it is not merely a court of
final appeal but, functionally understanding, a constitutional court because it admits a very
limited number of cases, which contain important constitutional issues, from federal appel-
late court and state supreme courts. In this sense it is not too much to say that the U.S. Su-
preme court is also a sort of special court. See Dai-Kwon Choi, The Politics of the Constitu-
tional Court: Centering Around its Structure and Function, 91 SEOUL NATIONAL
UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE 106, 115-116 (1993).
114. See discussion infra Part III.C.
115. SeeS.KOREACONST. art.l12, § 1.
116. Seeart.7 KCCC.
117. See S. KOREA CONST. art. 111 § 2.
118. See art.5. § 1 KCCC.
1999]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
point that in spite of being a law professor one should also have lawyer's
license" 9 to become a Justice. This means that a law professor, even with
many years of teaching and research experience, cannot become a Justice
unless he passes the national judicial examination. Therefore, in the com-
position of the KCC, law professors' participation cannot be found at all
so far. Most Korean law professors do not take the national judicial
exam."2 There are many arguments over legal reform on this point.' 2'
Fourth, a Justice cannot hold other offices during the tenure as in
Germany. He or she cannot serve concurrently as a congressman, civil
servant or consultant executive in a corporation or private organization,
and cannot manage his own business for profit.'2
B. The Competence of Constitutional Adjudication Institutions in these
Three Countries
1. The U.S.'23
a. Selection of Cases through Appeal and Certiorari
The U.S. Supreme Court has an exclusive first instance jurisdiction
over a conflict between two or more States, and has a non-exclusive first
instance jurisdiction over litigation in which a foreign ambassador is a
party and conflicts between the United States and a state. With the ex-
ception of these limitations, the Supreme Court has appellate
jurisdiction."4 The appellate jurisdiction has relatively more importance
and actually more cases than the other. The interpretation and application
of the Constitution is judged mostly in appellate cases.
Concerning judicial review, there are occasions when the constitu-
119. The lawyer's license is granted to the person who has completed a two year training
program at the Judicial Research and Training Institute (JRTI) of the Supreme Court after
passing the national judicial exam in Korea. The Lawyer Act provides for the qualifications
of lawyers as follows, "Any person who is a national of the Republic of Korea and who falls
under any of the following Subparagraphs shall be qualified as a lawyer: 1. Person who has
passed the Judicial Examination and completed the required course of the Judicial Research
and Training Institute; and 2. Person who has the qualifications for judge or public prosecu-
tor." Lawyer Act, art. 4.
120. See Chang Soo Yang, The Judiciary in Contemporary Society: Korea, 25 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L 303, 306 (1993). "Nearly all students in Korea who want to be a law pro-
fessor prefer to study abroad after graduation rather than enter JRTI (Judicial Research and
Training Institute) for the apprenticeship and apply for the national bar examination.... Only
four university professors are qualified as a lawyer." Id.
121. See discussion infra Part II.C.
122. Art.14KCCC.
123. For more on the competence of the U.S. Supreme Court, see generally G.R. STONE,
ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 111-123 (1986); BAUM supra note 60, at 25-32;
REHNQUIST supra note 60, at 253-56.
124. See 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994).
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tionality of laws and ordinances is reviewed under appellate jurisdiction
by the litigant's appeal and directly reviewed under the certiorari issued
to a U.S. Court of Appeals or State Supreme Court upon the litigant's
application. 5 Issuing of a writ of certiorari is subject to the discretion of
the U.S. Supreme Court. The court that reviewing the certiorari should
send all the records of the litigation to the U.S. Supreme Court. In this
judicial review, the court does not necessarily review only whether the
norm (law, administrative order etc.) is unconstitutional or not. The Su-
preme Court may reach a final decision in the case or may remand to a
lower court which will reach a final decision in the light of the Supreme
Court decision on the question of the constitutional law raised. The un-
constitutionality of an administrative order and administrative measure is
reviewable as well.
b. Legal Effect of the Decision Declaring Unconstitutionality
(1) The Function of Substantially General Effect
When a law is judged to be unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme
Court, the law is not invalidated in general but only in the particular case.
In other words, the judgment of the Court has just an individual effect. As
the U.S., however, has the principle of stare decisis, it reaches nearly the
same result as having a general effect. Of course, this does not mean that
the effect an unconstitutional ruling in the U.S. is completely the same as
that of other countries in which an unconstitutional ruling has a general
effect. In the countries where the unconstitutional ruling has a general
effect under concrete judicial review, after the ruling, the unconstitutional
law is repealed and the constitutional court ceases to have further occa-
sion to review that law again.
In the U.S., however, the unconstitutional law is not completely re-
pealed, so in the event of another review based on a different case there is
room for changing the previous position (constitutional ruling). In the
U.S., the general effect, which is not directly admitted is closely related
to the logic of justification for judicial review. Because the U.S. Consti-
tution does not specifically authorize judicial review, the power of the
Supreme Court to declare law unconstitutional is implied from its general
power to hear "cases and controversies." Thus, as a matter of pure logic,
the Court's decision that an act of government is unconstitutional can
only oe relevant to the outcome of the case before the Court. At any rate,
in substance, they reach the same result as having a general effect. 26
125. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1257 (1994).
126. See Dai-Kwon Choi, supra note 113, at 115-316 (estimating that concentrated and
non-concentrated types coincide with each other).
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(2) Natural Nullity from the Beginning (ex-tunc Wirkung)
When a lower law is inconsistent with a higher law, it is absolutely
void. Therefore, the unconstitutional law is naturally void from the be-
ginning. This is based on the idea that judicial review itself does not pro-
duce the effect of nullity, but is no more than a confirmatory declaration
of nullity on what is null from the beginning. This understanding has tra-
ditionally stood firm, yet depending on the nature of the case there is also
the idea that "natural nullity" cannot always be abstractly applied without
regard to the concrete effect on particular parties.
Because the U.S. Supreme Court only decides specific cases and
does not issue general declaration of unconstitutionality, the doctrine of
nullity from the beginning has an odd application in American constitu-
tional law. In the context of the particular case it is deciding, the Court
will treat any law it declares unconstitutional in that case as null from the
beginning for those parties in their case, but not necessarily as null from
the beginning in its earlier applications to other persons before the current
litigation arose. Thus the Court will sometimes hold that its current decla-
ration that a law is unconstitutional may not be retroactively applied to
earlier applications of that law about which litigation has been completed.
2. Germany
Article 13 of the FCCC imparts a vast range of powers to the FCC,
but Article 93 of the German Grundgesetz enumerates the competence of
the FCC in a concrete way as well. Therefore, we can conclusively say
that the FCC has jurisdiction over the cases that the Grundgesetz enumer-
ates. The interpretation of constitutional law provisions and legal provi-
sions about competence of the FCC, however, is conducted by the FCC in
the long run, so the authority to decide concrete competence is given to
the FCC itself.
a. Abstract Judicial Review
German Constitutional Law provides for abstract judicial review by
FCC; the FCC decides "in case of differences of opinion or doubts on the
formal and material compatibility of federal law or state law with this
Constitution, or on the compatibility of state law with other federal law,
at the request of the federal government, state government, or of one third
of the Bundesiag members."'27 The subject of abstract judicial review
consists of all legal norms. It includes laws properly passed by munici-
palities or other types of corporate bodies,t2 but it should, by all means,
be laws that are promulgated.12
127. See Art.93, § 1, Nr.2 GG.
128. See Zeidler, supra note 97, at 505.
129. It does not have to be in force, however. If it is after promulgation, it becomes the
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Judicial review falls under the jurisdiction of the Erste Senat of the
FCC. In the event federal law is against the Constitutional law (Grundge-
setz) or State law (Landesrecht) is against Constitutional law or federal
law, the judicially reviewed federal law or state law is declared void
(nichtig). This decision is made by the consent of more than half of the
present judges when more than six of the eight judges are present.13° It
binds all of the constitutional organizations, courts, and administrative
organs. The legal provisions that are declared void have no effect from
the beginning.' In the occasion where it cannot be void in nature from
the beginning- e.g., domains of law concerning taxation and finance,
realms of continuous benefit administration, the FCC may hold its deci-
sion to be in force only prospectively. These kinds of exceptions are ad-
mitted on a large scale, but criminal cases are not among the categories in
which unconstitutionality can be prospective only. 32
Practically, the party that makes request for abstract judicial review
is, many times, either the political opposition in the Bundestag or a state
government governed by the opposition party. German commentators
point out only the political disputes that were unsuccessfully resolved in
the Bundestag are brought to the FCC for abstract judicial review. Ac-
cording to Wolfgang Zeidler, a former Chief Justices of German FCC, the
abstract judicial review has ran into criticism because it "forces the FCC
to decide the constitutionality of a legal norm without access to sufficient
information regarding the implementation of the norm or its implica-
tions."'33
b. Concrete Judicial Review
German Constitutional Law provides for concrete judicial review by
FCC: "Where a court considers that a statute on whose validity the
court's decision depends is unconstitutional, the proceedings have to be
stayed, and a decision has to be obtained from ... the FCC where this
Constitution is held to be violated.' 3 4 Therefore, the applicant is not the
litigants but rather the court. To certify the question of compatibility, the
court must be sure of the unconstitutionality of that norm, because if there
exists any possibility to interpret the norm conforming with the Constitu-
tion, the court should do so instead. In this meaning each court has the
competence of investigation (Priifungskompetenz) that is distinct from the
competence of rejection (Verwerfungskompetenz). The court is not af-
subject of review regardless it is in force or not.
130. See art. 15 § 2 FCCC.
131. It is so-called "ex-tunc Wirkung." Art.79 § 1 FCCC.
132. Seeart. 79 § I FCCC.
133. Zeidler, supra note 97, at 505.
134. See art. 100, § 1.
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fected by the litigants' pleas that allege the nullity of the norm.'35
The Bundestag may seek concrete as well as abstract judicial review,
and further the FCCC bestows that opportunity on concerned litigants as
well. 136 In addition, the FCC can demand a reply to some legal questions
from the Federal Supreme Court (oberster Gerichtshof des Bundes) and
State Supreme Court (oberster Landesgericht). These questions are how
the Supreme Courts have interpreted the Constitution on the disputed
matter so far, how the Courts have applied the disputed provisions and
the nature of the legal issues raised in the litigation.'37
There are two different types of nullity that are declared by the Court
in a judicial review, including abstract judicial review as stated before.
The first is "nullity" (incompatibility), which is the typical type discussed
so far. This legal effect is based on the traditional German doctrine that
states that a norm, which violates a higher norm, is void ex ipso and ex
tunc. The law also provides the FCC with the opportunity to nullify other
particular provisions of the same law as long as these are incompatible
with the Constitution for the same reasons.
The second type is partial nullity. There scarcely is a need for the
complete nullification of a law or other legal norm. Even an individual
legal provision need not always be wholly proclaimed unconstitutional
and void. Restrictions on judicial review may result from particular con-
stitutional procedures. In the context of concrete judicial review, the lim-
ited range of the introduced issues may restrict the Court's ability to in-
validate an entire law. 138 The FCC may get to the conclusion that only
part of a linguistically divisible provision is unconstitutional. Partial nul-
lity may be invoked in the case of a requirement not specifically men-




The constitutional complaint (Verfassungsbeschwerde) can be lodged
on thiree occasions. First, when a concerned person applies for the FCC's
review on the decisions by the Bundestag pertaining to the validity of
elections and the loss of congressional membership,"4 Second, when a
self-governing body apply for the FCC's review insisting a federal law or
a state law infringe autonomy written in Article 28, Section 2 of the
Grundgesetz.14' Third, when any person applies for the FCC's review
135. See art. 91(A) FCCC.
136. See art. 82 §§ 1, 3 FCCC.
137. See id. at § 4.
138. Those are often more clearly specified by FCCC.
139. See Zeidler, supra note 97, at 508-509.
140. See art. 41 GG.
141. See art. 93, §1 (4)(B) GG.
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asserting a violation by a public authority of either basic rights or certain
other constitutional rights. 42 The third occasion is the most typical. The
constitutional complaint can be lodged against any act of public authority
such as measures taken by administrative agencies and court decisions.143
From the statistics, this remedy accounts for over 90% of the FCC's
caseload. 144
However, the complainant must have exhausted all other available
judicial remedies before filing a constitutional complaint. Available legal
recourse must be exhausted prior to any such review by the FCC. 45 A
constitutional complaint lodged directly against a law or legal norm is
only admissible if certain restrictive conditions are met, 46 but they are
very exceptional occasions. Above all, the complainant himself or herself
must "presently" and "directly" be affected by the law. 47
Moreover, the Court increasingly requires that it must not be reason-
able for the complainant to first seek relief by following the ordinary re-
course of law.1" The claim of constitutional complaint starts with the
presentation of a claiming document and the period of claim is one
month.' 49
There are two types of judgments. One is rejection judgment, the
other is admission judgment. In the case of the latter, the judges should
specify what provision of the Grundgesetz is violated and what kind of
feasances and omissions violate the provision of the Grundgesetz. When
the constitutional complaint on a decision of the Administration or the
judicature is admitted, the FCC revokes the decision. When the constitu-
tional complaint on a legal provision is admitted, the FCC declares the
invalidity of the provision."s The force of an invalidity declaration of a
legal provision is same as that of a judicial review. 5'
142. See id. at §1.
143. See Zeidler, supra note 97, at 506.
144. See SCHLESINGER ET AL., supra note 5, at 376.
145. It is so-called the exhaustion of the other legal remedies doctrine. See id. at 376-77.
146. See Zeidler, supra note 97, at 506. In the event that the character of dispute has a gen-
eral meaning (allgemeine Bedeutung), and in the event if an applicant goes by way of the
other legal remedies an important and irrecoverable damage (schwerer und unabwendbarer
Nachted) would be produced to the applicant. See Art. 90, §2 FCCC.
147. The self-relatedness, directness and presentness of the right are very important prereq-
uisites for seeking the constitutional complaint, which are formulated by the FCC's previous
precedents. See Zeidler, supra note 97, at 506
148. See Id. at 506.
149. See art. 93, § 1 FCCC.
150. Revoking the decision of the Administration and the judicature, the judges declare the
invalidity of the legal provision as well upon which the decision is based, if the invalidity of
the decision is caused by the unconstitutionality of the very legal provision.
151. See art. 95, §3, art. 79, art. 31, Sec § 2 FCCC.
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d. The Other Competencies
Additionally, the FCC has competence over the jurisdictional dis-
putes between governmental organizations, 52 the decision of political
party dissolution,'53 the decision of impeachment,'54 the decision of losing
basic right,'55 federal litigation,' and election cases and demurrer on the
Bundestag's disqualification decision of its member.'57 However, the
number of decisions by the FCC made on these cases is not large, so
these competence have less actual importance than the judicial review
and constitutional complaint competence stated in detail above.
3. Korea
a. Influence of the U.S.
The competencies of constitutional institutions in Korea have been
changed by revisions of the relevant Constitutional and legal provisions
in each Republic. 5 Under the present Constitution, the KCC has the
most kinds of competencies, which include the constitutionality of a stat-
ute upon the request of the courts, impeachment, dissolution of a political
party, disputes over jurisdiction among state agencies and local govern-
152. Seeart. 93 § 1(1) GG; art. 63 FCCC.
153. See art. 21 § 2 GG; art. 43, § 2, art. 45 FCCC.
154. See art. 61 § 1, art. 42 ,§2, art. 98, §2, art. 58 GG; art. 4, 50-52,57, 59FCCC.
155. Seeart. 18GG;art. 37,39-40 FCCC.
156. See art. 93, § 1(3), art. 84, § 2, art. 93, § 1(4), art. 13(8) GG; art. 13(7), art. 68-72
FCCC.
157. See art. 48, § 1 FCCC.
158. To paraphrase, the Constitution of the first republic gave the competence of concrete
judicial review to the Constitutional Committee. The Constitution of the second republic
gave the Constitutional Court jurisdiction over the final interpretation of the Constitution,
judgment on the unconstitutionality of a legal provision, jurisdictional disputes between
governmental organizations, the decision of a political party dissolution, the decision of
impeachment and election cases for the President, the Chief Justice and the Justices. Under
the Constitution of the third republic the Impeachment Committee took the charge of the
decision of impeachment, and the decision of political party dissolution, and the concrete
judicial review belonged to the competence of general courts. The Constitution of the fourth
republic established the Constitutional Committee, which had jurisdiction over concrete
judicial review, the decision of impeachment and the decision of political party dissolution.
The Constitution of the fifth republic gave the competence on the concrete judicial review,
the decision of impeachment and the decision of political party dissolution, and the compe-
tence on judicial review of administrative ordinances regulations and election cases were
given to the general courts. However, in the fourth and fifth republics, the Supreme Court
could decide whether to forward the case to the Constitutional Committee or not in a con-
crete judicial review case, and it produced a bad result that not even one case was filed dur-
ing that period. See YOUNG-SUNG KwoN, supra note 105, at 1144-46.
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ment and constitutional complaints as prescribed by statute.'-"
Among these competencies, concrete judicial review is the very thing
that has been directly affected by the U.S. Concrete judicial review is the
only and representative competence of constitutional adjudication which
has continuously existed since the first republic in Korea. Actually, when
enacting the Korean Constitution of the first republic, provisions on con-
crete judicial review were adopted that had been present since its draft-
ing-stage without an objection." When we think that the device of judi-
cial review is the invention of the U.S. Supreme Court built up by the
precedent of Marbury v. Madison (1803) and spread to the other coun-
tries including Germany in the early twentieth century, the influence of
the U.S. experience becomes more understandable.
Even though Korea has received some elements of judicial review
from Germany, it can be said that in a wide sense these factors were
originally modeled on the U.S., even if received via Germany. Among the
factors, some have been transformed into the Germanized style. Admit-
ting the general effect over the individual effect as the force of ruling
"against the Constitution" can be offered as a typical example. Of course,
Korea admits the general effect like Germany," but, as stated before,
because of the principle of stare decisis in the U.S., the U.S. reaches
nearly the same result as having a general effect when we see it on the
whole.' 63
b. Influence of Germany
The fact that the present Korean Constitution adopts the "Constitu-
tional Court" system means in a sense that it begins to follow the model
of the German "Constitutional Court" system in many aspects. The most
obvious example is KCC's competence rather than its composition.1 64
159. See S. KOREAN CONST. Art. 111, § 1.
160. See generally, Hyo-Jeon Kim, The Effect of American Judicial Review to Korea, in
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND KOREAN CONSTITUrION 339-40 (1989).
161. See generally, R. J. TRESOLINI, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 67 (1959). Even
though there is an opinion that art. 3. § 2, cl. 1 is the provisional foundation for the judicial
review on the federal laws by the Federal Supreme Court, so-called national judicial review,
the prevailing opinion states that all kinds of judicial reviews were established decisively by
the Chief Justice Marshall's decision in the Marbury v. Madison case.
162. See art. 47 KCCC. A law or legal provision declared to be unconstitutional loses its
force. However, the point of time when the provision loses its force is different between
Korea and Germany. In Germany the unconstitutional provision becomes naturally void from
the beginning (ex-tunc Wirkung). In Korea the unconstitutional provision, unless being
criminal law provision, loses its force from the day of riding unconstitutional. See art. 47 § 2
FCCC.
163. See discussion supra, Part III.A 1.
164. In the composition of the Court, we can say that the U.S. had a greater effect than
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Except for abstract judicial review, the present Korean Constitution has
adopted nearly all the competence of German Constitutional Court.
The KCC does not have the competence of abstract judicial review,
but rather, as stated before, concrete judicial review competence which
was originally affected by the United States. However, in the type of de-
cision after judicial review, Germany had a direct influence on Korea,
through the so-called variational type of decision. In the event there is no
need for the complete nullification of a law or a provision, it need not
always be proclaimed entirely unconstitutional and void. Where a sudden
declaration of nullity is likely to damage legal stability, the temporary
reservation of a nullity declaration can be a better solution. For these
events, some kinds of variational type of decisions are invented through
the German precedents, which are the decision of restricted constitution-
ality, the decision of disagreement with the constitution and the decision
of urging legislation.
Employing the decision of restricted constitutionality, the judge can
avoid the nullity declaration by interpreting the norm restrictively so as to
bring it into conformity with the constitution. The decision of disagree-
ment with the constitution means that even though admitting the uncon-
stitutionality of the norm, the judge acknowledges its temporary force in
order to prevent a legal vacuum and chaos. The decision of urging legis-
lation announces that, although the norm is constitutional at the time of
review, it is likely to be unconstitutional in the future in such a decision.
The judge can urge the legislators to revise or replace the norm in order
to prevent unconstitutionality in the future." On these types of decisions
there are no legal or constitutional provisions, but the KCC adopted them
from the practice of the FCC.
Second, the present Korean Constitution has adopted the German
constitutional complaint system for the first time."6 Article 68, Section 1
of the KCCC says that a person who has had his constitutional rights in-
fringed by any act or omission of public authority, "except for a court's
decision," can lodge a constitutional complaint to the KCC. The only dif-
ferent point from the German system for constitutional complaint is that
Korea has excluded a court's decision from the subject of constitutional
complaint. This part of the KCCC is criticized by many legal scholars
because it reduces the efficiency of the entire constitutional complaint
system in that a court's decision concerning an act of administrative
agencies may indirectly prevent the injured person from lodging a con-
stitutional complaint even on the act of administrative agencies. Further,
it induces conflicts in the ranking of courts between the KCC and general
Germany. See discussion supra, Part III.C.
165. See YOUNG-SUNG KWON, supra note 158 at 1166-67.
166. See S. KOREA CONST. art. 111 § 1, cl. 5.
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courts, especially the Supreme Court, by making the general court's deci-
sion free from the KCC's judging."16
The other elements of constitutional complaint are nearly the same as
those of Germany. Before filing a constitutional complaint, the complain-
ant should have exhausted other available judicial remedies." The KCC
adopted the self-relatedness, directness and presentness of the infringed
right as prerequisites for seeking the constitutional complaint from Ger-
man precedents."
The period of claim, when the complainant can apply for the com-
plaint, is restricted to a short period in the interest of legal stability, but
the length of time is different. The period is sixty days in Korea and one
month in Germany after knowing of the infringement. 7
The decision of impeachment, political party dissolution and the set-
tlement of jurisdictional disputes among national agencies and local gov-
ernment are nearly the same as those of Germany because they are di-
rectly imported from Germany. A clear difference is their quorum in de-
ciding the Court's opinion. The quorum is six for impeachment and dis-
solution of political party, and the majority of present judges who are
more than seven. 7'
C. Proposals for the desirable institutional reform of constitutional court
system in Korea
So far, we surveyed the constitutional adjudication system of the
U.S. and Germany, and analyzed the effect of both countries on Korea.
Generally speaking, Korea has adopted many technical factors from
Germany, mainly based on the idea of American judicial review. Daring
to try an evaluation of the current situation of Korean adjudication sys-
tem, it can be said that it has worked well up to now. However, it also has
some problems that need reform in some parts.
First, Korea needs to reestablish the jurisdiction between the KCC
and the Korean Supreme Court. In a constitutional complaint case dealing
with the unconstitutionality of the Supreme Court Rule for the enforce-
167. See generally, Dai-Kwon Choi, supra note 126 at 107, 112-113. Such an abnormal
provisional exemption was enacted through the Supreme Court's lobby to the legislators.
168. The provisory clause of KCCC art. 68 § 1 states "after finishing the other judicial
remedies if available." The KCCC admits the doctrine of exhaustion of other judicial reme-
dies. In the U.S. the doctrine seems to be adopted in state court level. "[T]he state court of
last resort has jurisdiction in a particular action, provided that all remedies have been duly
exhausted." See ABRAHAM, supra note 61, at 180.
169. See Zeidler, supra note 97, at 506.
170. "The constitutional complaint should be applied by the complainant within sixty days
after he knows the infringement." KCCC art. 69.
171. SeeS. KOREA CONST. art.113 § 1.
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ment of the judicial scrivener exam,172 there was jurisdictional conflict
between the two courts. The conflict comes from the fact that the right of
final judicial review on legal norms is not uniformly given to one court.
While the right of final judicial review on laws is given to the KCC, the
right on administrative rules and orders is bestowed to the Korean Su-
preme Court. Let us think about the nature of constitutional adjudication
for a while. it has different backgrounds, principles and techniques,
which are distinguished from the other fields of adjudication. Giving full
powers for constitutional adjudication, including the power of final judi-
cial review on administrative rules and orders, like Germany, is better
than separating the powers into different courts, in order to prevent this
kind of useless conflict and further to unify the interpretation of constitu-
tional law.
Second, Korea needs reform in the way of staffing the KCC. Korea
requires judicial qualification that is passage of the national bar examina-
tion as a Justice qualification. It blocks the participation of law professors
who have a good knowledge of constitutional law but have not taken the
examination. Germany makes the most of the knowledge of law profes-
sors through their participation on the FCC. In appointment procedure,
there is too much intervention of the other branches (the Executive and
the Congress). This intervention works against the achievement of an
independent judiciary shielded from the pressure of the branches. As
stated before, the Justice's term of office is six years in Korea. The U.S.
gives us a good lesson that life tenure of the office contributes much to
the judicial independence.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION AND SUPPORT OF THE OTHER
BRANCHES
When the constitutional court invalidates legal norms that are made
by Congress or Administrative agencies, the court loses the support of the
other branches. Its very existence may be threatened by the other
branches. This can be seen by examining examples in the States and
Germany and even in Korea, although the examples in Korea are ex-
tremely few compared to those of the former two western countries,
having long histories and many judgments in constitutional adjudication.
Judicial independence in constitutional adjudication and its limitations
are crucial issues for judicial studies."'
172. See generally, Moon-hyun Kim, The Relationship between Korean Constitutional
Court and Korean Supreme Court in THEORY AND REALITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL
ADJUDICATION 79-107 (1993).
173. In this study, historical methods will be used to analyze examples. Therefore, this
chapter will be long on facts and short on analysis.
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A. U.S. Supreme Court and Court Packing Plan
In the public eye, Court packing has been most closely associated
with Franklin D. Roosevelt. Having had not a single opportunity to fill a
Court vacancy in his first term from 1933 to 1937 and seeing his domes-
tic programs continually attacked by the Court, the frustrated President
tried to get his way just once. This was Roosevelt's court-packing bill. 74
Roosevelt, who worked with a Democratic majority in Congress,
enacted a series of new programs collectively known as the New Deal.
However, in 1935 and 1936, as the courts challenged these new pro-
grams, the U.S. Supreme Court declared them unconstitutional as beyond
the scope of national authority. The Court frequently cited federalism as
the basis of its decisions.7 ' According to the Court's reasoning the na-
tional government was one of restrained and delegated authority. The
10th Amendment of the Constitution expressly makes the point that the
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution are reserved
to the states. The Court maintained that if the interstate commerce clause
or the power to tax and spend could be interpreted to allow the national
government to reach "local activities" such as manufacturing, mining and
agriculture, then the federal authority would cover actually all the activi-
ties of the people, and the authority of the state over its domestic con-
cerns would exist only by tolerance of the federal government." 6
These decisions placed the U.S. in what can only be called a "con-
stitutional crisis." In the middle of this crisis, Roosevelt was reelected to
a second term as President and immediately turned his attention to the
problem of the U.S. Supreme Court. He proposed that Congress enact
legislation that would allow him to appoint an additional Justices to the
Supreme Court for every sitting Justice over seventy years of age at that
time. His public justification for the proposal was that the Court was
overworked and needed the additional Justices to keep up with its
caseload. However, everyone knew that what Roosevelt really wanted
was to pack the Court with more friendly Justices.'
Roosevelt's proposal sparked controversy, and in spite of the Presi-
dent's great popularity, no one could be sure that his court-packing plan
would have passed if it had come to a formal vote in the Congress. ' The
174. See generally, Henry J. Abraham, Can Presidents Really Pack the Supreme Court? in
AN ESSENTIAL SAFEGUARD: ESSAYS ON THE UNrrED STATES SUPREME COURT AND ITS
JUSTICES 43-44 (1991).
175. See Ellis Katz, The U.S. Supreme Court and the Integration of American Federal-
ism in FEDRALISM AND SUPREME COURTS 35, 42 (Edmond Orban ed., 1991).
176. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
177. See Katz, supra note 175, at 40-44.
178. See id. at 43.
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court-packing plan offered by President D. Roosevelt in 1937 caused a
storm of protest. Roosevelt was accused of using trickery to endanger the
coequal status of the judiciary. Some opponents of the plan objected in
particular to any interference with the Court's historic role as guardian of
the Constitution. When the Senate Judiciary Committee reported ad-
versely on the reorganization bill, it said that the bill "applies force to the
judiciary ... its initial and ultimate effect would undermine the independ-
ence of the courts ... it undermines the protection our constitutional sys-
tem gives to minorities and is subversive of rights of individuals." '179
The committee report emphasized the importance of keeping an in-
dependent judiciary:
It is essential to the continuance of the constitutional democracy that
the judiciary be completely independent of both the executive and leg-
islative branches of the government, and we assert that independent
courts are the last safeguard of the citizen, where his rights reserved to
him by the express and implied provisions of the Constitution, come in
conflict with the power of governmental agencies."8
Furthermore, the committee claimed that the framers never wavered
in their belief that an independent judiciary and a Constitution defining
with clarity the rights of the people were the only safeguards of the citi-
zen. The responsibility of Congress and the President to safeguard con-
stitutional rights was omitted from this claim. The committee also lapsed
into exaggeration by stating, "Minority political groups, no less than re-
ligious and racial groups, have never failed, when forced to appeal to the
U.S. Supreme Court to find in its opinions the reassurance and protection
of their constitutional rights. 1.1 The committee report included some ex-
amples to show how the Court protected human rights in cases involving
Chinese, blacks, the press, and labor unions as well. The committee con-
cluded that the independence of the judiciary was the only certain protec-
tion for individual rights.11 2
Roosevelt's proposal never came to a vote because in the middle of
the political battle the Supreme Court changed its mind, and in two sur-
prising decisions"' upheld both state and federal regulation of the econ-
omy. This judicial turnaround was so complete that there have been only
179. See Louis Fisher, One of the Guardians Some of the Tite, in IS THE SUPREME COURT
THE GUARDIAN OF THE COURT? 175 (Robert A. Licht ed., 1993) (quoting S. Rep. No. 75-
711, at 3 (1937)).
180. See id. at 14.
181. See id. at 20.
182. See id. at 87-88.
183. See National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. 301 U.S. 1
(1937), West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
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two decisions since 1937 in which the court held that Congress exceeded
its authority under the interstate commerce clause." 4
B. Germany and Nazi Court
When it comes to Germany, the Court under Hitler's rule is a vivid
example of the problem. In this period, the courts in Germany did not
have judicial independence. Over the composition of the Judiciary in-
cluding the appointment of the Justices, Hitler exercised his almost lim-
itless power. Therefore, the courts did not play a role as the bulwark of
people's right, rather were just the subordinate agencies that confirmed
the law and regulations enacted by Hitler's government. If not, the judge
was removed from the judiciary. In Hitler's government, the Executive,
the Legislature and the Court, which were filled with the members of
Nazi party, were in a perfect order issued by Hitler, the Fiihrer. It was
expressed as "loyalty to state leadership."18
5
Legal positivism was an important factor making the Court weak
during this period. The Justices felt precluded from challenging inhumane
and unjust Nazi laws because they had been trained to separate law and
morality in their positivistic legal education. There was a fairly large de-
gree of overlap between the ideas and attitudes of middle-class conserva-
tives in the Weimar Republic and the National Socialists. 86 The Weimar
Court was reluctant to punish Nazis, particularly Hitler, with the full
force of the law. The basic legal principle of Nazi dictatorship- "whatever
benefits the people is right"-been established by the highest courts five
years before the Nazis seized power. 7
Documented in meticulous detail, were many cases ranging from
racial law to criminal law and military law. In April of 1939, Max Israel
Adler, a Jew, was sentenced to one month imprisonment for looking
across the street at the fifteen year old (German-blooded) Ilse S.88 In
early 1942, the sixty-seven-year-old Jew, Leo Katzenberger was sen-
tenced to death for alleged sexual relations with an Aryan woman.'89
The party courts (Reich-Uschla) usurped many judicial powers from
184. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); U.S. v. Lopez 514 U.S.
549(1995).
185. See, INGO MULLER, HITLER'S JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH 297
(Deborah Lucas Schneidef trans., 1991).
186- See id. at 293-94.
187. See id. at 24.
188. See Markus Dirk Dubber, Judicial Positivism and Hitler's Injustice, 93 COLUM L
REV. 1807, 1810 (1993).
189. See id. at 1810. The sentencing court specifically referred to Kazenberger's frivolity as
evidenced by the fact that "neither the National Socialist Revolution of 1933 nor the procla-
mation of the Blood Protection Law in 1935, neither the action against Jews of 1938 nor the
outbreak of the war in 1939, sufficed to make him change his ways." Id.
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the regular courts in this period. The significance of the work of party's
courts for the average German was that he could presumably expect to
live under the suspicion and could barely anticipate a bright future in his
job or community unless he belonged to the NSDAP. This was particu-
larly true of those in certain professions: teachers, doctors, lawyers and
civil service employees (Beamten) in the government."9
When Hitler was appointed as Chancellor, members of such groups
clearly started to recognize the dismal facts of life instantaneously, in as
much as thousands rushed to join the party in 1933 and 1934.1"' The same
mass inflow was true of teachers and lawyers. Lawyers or judges failing
to join the party could anticipate complete removal from privileged pro-
motions and recurrent denial of even normal professional
advancements. "
Until late 1933, the Reichts-Uschla and its lower courts had experi-
enced few important organizational changes. At the end of the year, a
series of state and party laws were enacted which significantly increased
the penal and disciplinary powers of the Uschlas. An Uschlas circular
formally renamed the committees calling them simply Parteigerichte
(party courts). The Reichs-Uschla became the Oberstes Parteigericht
(Supreme party courts, or OPG), each Gau-Uschla a Gaugericht (district
court) and each Orts-Uschla an Ortsgericht (local court). In as much as
party organizations had been formed at the Kreis (county) level as well,
the order provided for the renaming of the Kreis-Uschlas.
The Kreis- Uschlas became Kreisgerichte (county courts) and were to
operate administratively between the Gaugerichte and the Ortsgerichte.
Within the constitutional framework of the Third Reich, the Partei-
gerichte were established as official legal institutions in the German state
by the Act Securing Unity of Party and State that was decreed by the
Reich government on December 1, 1933. Until 1942 and the last several
years of World War II, the basic law governing the Parteigerichte was a
directive issued by the Reichsleitung in 1934. The order was the result of
a great deal of planning that began with a memorandum on party justice
drafted by Hitler himself.
These party courts were still less independent, compared with the
other formal courts. They were not courts which exercised independent
judicial power, but subdivisions of a Nazi party. Accordingly, the other
branches of the government including Hitler himself directly affected
them."'93
190. DONALD M. McKALE, THE NAZI PARTY COURTS 114(1974).
191. By January 1935, "some 307,205 civil servants in Germany were members of the
NSDAP, and about 250,000 entered the party between 30 January and 30 April 1933." Id.
192. See, MCKALE, supra note 190, at114-15.
193. In 1934, "Hess ordered the OPG to investigate the rebellious Ly, but Hitler, again
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C. Korea and Judiciary Crisis
Just after the emancipation from Japan, the early judiciary in Korea
was very independent, owed to the efforts of Chief Justice Kim Byung-
Ro who always emphasized judicial independence against other govern-
mental branches. Generally speaking, this tradition in the Korean judici-
ary was kept until the 1960s. The tradition came to be fiercely threatened
by President Park Jyung-Hee in 1970, who was becoming a dictator at
that time.
The so-called "judiciary crisis" (1970) occurred because of President
Park's desire for revenge on the Supreme Court Justices who had de-
clared some important Acts'94 unconstitutional.1 95 Park became angry at
the judiciary and, by many strategies, forced the Justices to retire. Be-
cause of this crisis, more than half of the Justices were replaced. At that
time, the Constitution provided that Supreme Court Justices should be
appointed by the President upon the proposal of the Chief Justice after he
had secured the approval of the majority of the Council for the Recom-
mendation of Judges, and their tenure of office was guaranteed for 6
years. However, the President compelled them to resign before the com-
pletion of the tenure. This judiciary crisis became a bad precedent and
judges were reluctant to hold laws unconstitutional. At that time, judicial
independence in Korean judiciary received a great blow and judicial pas-
sivism has continued to spread widely over the Korean judiciary.
V. CONCLUSION
In its institutional aspect, as stated above, the Korean Constitutional
Court adopted and imitated the German Constitutional Court system,
based on the concept of American judicial review. Therefore, it has many
common institutional factors with that of the U.S. and Germany, and in-
deed shares in many of the features common to all judicial review sys-
tems. The threat from other governmental branches to the Court was also
a universal phenomenon suffered by every judiciary in the world. On the
revealing his old lack of respect for the party judiciary, intervened in Hess's favor before the
conflict could reach the OPG and thus create a major embarrassment for the Fiihrer." Id. at
131-32.
194. E.g., Article 3 of National Indemnity Act, which restricted the indemnity claim of the
military and police to the State, was invalidated for violating the Equal Protection Clause.
This decision widened the scope of State liability.
195. Under the Constitution of the Third Republic (1962-1972), the Supreme Court ac-
quired the power to decide with finality the constitutionality of a law when a determination
of its constitutionality was prerequisite to deciding a case before a court. This was the closest
the Korean system came to the United States system of constitutional adjudication. See gen-
erally, SUPREME COURT OF REPUBLIC OF KOREA, JUSTICE IN KOREA 5-11 (1981).
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other hand, the role of Constitutional adjudication in Korea can be seen as
an example of particularity. The role of constitutional adjudication in Ko-
rea as a unitary state, was different from that of the U.S. and Germany, as
federal states. While the latter was the final arbiter in federal-state rela-
tions, the former was to directly protect the people's constitutional rights
by the interpretation of the Korean Constitution. I believe that argument
about institutional reform should be preceded by an exact understanding
of the universality and particularity of the Korean constitutional adjudi-
cation system.
As long as the efforts for developing a better constitutional adjudica-
tion system, through timely and successful reform based on this kind of
analysis, are made continuously in Korea, the Korean constitutional adju-
dication system will continue to develop and the protection of the funda-
mental rights of the Korean people will be further strengthened.
